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Banking Stability and Shadow Banking: A
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Abstract

This paper analyses commercial banking and shadow banking, with the intention of
understanding different channels of instability that can occur through both types of banking for
the United States. The work is pioneering a comprehensive vision of shadow banking and its
interrelation with commercial banking. The results of the work are designed to encourage
reflection on possible mediums to promote the stability of shadow banking, through new risk
indicators. Finally, these indicators are tested using machine learning techniques.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this work, an analysis of shadow banking in the United States and its links with traditional
banking is carried out. There are several studies that analyze shadow banking, from different
points of view from its influence on risk, for instance Vento and La Langa (2013), Adrian
(2014), Maeno et al. (2014) and Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2019). In this present work, the
aim is to obtain a comprehensive vision of the influence of shadow banking on traditional
banking and vice versa. One of the advantages of the work is that it approaches the subject
from a holistic position, in which all the institutions of shadow banking are collected and allows
us to analyze their interaction with traditional banking.
Another novelty is the use of a methodology, which is canonical analysis, rarely applied in
works of this type, which allows us to have a temporary evaluation of interactions. Once the
most important relationships between both types of banking have been described, and what
may be the bridges of instability between the two, an attempt is made to propose a possible
macroprudential regulation of shadow banking. For this, the methodology used by the Basel
committee based on the Hodrick Prescott filter is used, but with different variables obtained
from shadow banking. The time series cluster is also applied and finally a Random Forest
algorithm to evaluate the results of the instability of shadow banking on the losses that are
caused in traditional banking.
Some shadow banking risk indicators could coexist with traditional banking and serve as a
complement to macroprudential policy for future regulation. In our opinion, said policy suffers
from weaknesses because part of the financial system is not regulated. Therefore, the regulation
used by the Basel committee for the formation of countercyclical capital could be improved
using one of the landmarks of Basel III, to avoid procyclicality.
It starts with the state of the art. In section 2, a general analysis of shadow banking in the United
States and the canonical analysis that puts it in relation to traditional banking are carried out,
using various variables. In section 3, the gaps of the shadow banking indicators are obtained
and a cluster of time series is performed to analyze their evolution. Finally, in section 4,
machine learning evaluates the shadow banking indicators to study their prediction of the
instability of traditional banking.

2. State of the art
We begin by establishing a classification of shadow banking according to different
perspectives. For the FSB (2011) the shadow banking system is the credit intermediation
system that involves entities and activities outside the regular banking system. Specifically,
shadow banking covers all financial activities and entities that increased systemic risk due to
maturity transformation, leverage, liquidity or regulatory arbitrage. The FSB (2015) identifies
five economic functions through which non-bank credit intermediation can present similar
systemic risks to banks for the financial system. The economic functions defined by the FSB
and the entities that typically participate in activities related to each function are: i)
Management of collective investment vehicles as different types of funds; ii) provision of loans
with short-term financing, such as financial companies; iii) intermediation in the market that is
dependent on short-term financing or secured financing from clients, for example brokers or
dealers; iv) facilitation of credit creation; and iv) credit guarantors and securitisation based on
credit intermediation as securitization vehicles. Another type of classification of shadow
banking is established according to the relationship with traditional banking and its degree of
specialization, carried out by Pozsar et al. (2012). They establish four groups: i) the first is
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defined as internal shadow banking and consists of activities carried out by bank holding
subsidiaries, these activities are included in the structure of traditional banking; ii) external
shadow banking, consists of independent and regulated institutions that carry out shadow
banking activities, but these do not represent its main business; for example independent
stockbrokers, independent wealth management institutions, credit hedge funds and financial
companies, iii) independent shadow banking, consists of entities that specialize only in shadow
banking, such as structured investment vehicles, independent money market funds; and iv)
government-sponsored shadow banking, includes government-sponsored companies such as
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the United States.
One of the outstanding characteristics of banking in the shadow of the previous definitions is
its fragility. In fact, McCulley (2007) highlights that it does not benefit from a safety net or
other official guarantees. This leads to greater fragility for said type of banking. Likewise,
Agirman et al. (2013) highlight the fragility of such banking and define shadow banking as a
great variety of highly leveraged institutions that do not take deposits that lend a lot and borrow
shortly in liquid markets. Fragility occurs from a point of solvency as well as liquidity; although
it can be argued that not having a safety net is very unwise, the moral hazard problems created
by deposit insurance would be alleviated, as stated by Benveniste and Berger (1987).
The regulation of shadow banking would be one of the solutions to this fragility. Currently, the
regulation of traditional banking can be considered as an element that favored the development
of shadow banking, for Górnicka (2016) shadow banking arises as a result of regulatory
arbitration and for Plantin (2014), banking in the shadow arises from a high capital requirement
that is suboptimal. This forces banks to switch to off-balance sheet intermediation, where
adverse selection problems are more severe. In this line Irani et al. (2020) investigate the
connections between bank capital regulation and shadow banking in the US corporate loan
market. The USA finds that less capitalised banks retain fewer loans, and increase volatility
from asset sales. This occurs due to the fragility of shadow banking financing.
Although the fragility of shadow banking is one of its major problems, there are several authors
who highlight advantages, for example, Irani et al. (2020) find that non-bank entities may have
the flexibility to provide substitute credit when bank capital restrictions are tightened, thus
allowing borrowers to maintain access to credit. They also note that non-banks may be more
diversified and less systemically important, and therefore shifting risks to the non-banking
sector could improve overall financial stability. But considering that the reallocation of credit
could be counterproductive if the risks are simply transferred to unregulated entities, this also
presents significant risks to the financial system.
Another advantage of shadow banking, although nuanced, according to the cycle of the
economy, as maintained by Moreira and Savov (2014), shadow banks provide money-like and
information-insensitive values. When there are no financial strains, additional liquidity
encourages household savings, encourages investment, and increases growth. In contrast, in
shocks, the values of shadow banking become illiquid, deleveraging accelerations and the
execution of guarantees occurs. This occurs as explained by Adrian et al. (2013), because the
shadow bank's leverage tends to be high when the balance sheets are large and credit
intermediation is expanding. Furthermore, capital is countercyclical, as intermediaries tend to
hold as little capital as possible during booms, but are forced to increase capital during
recessions when market risk increases. In this line, Deutsche Bundesbank (2014) shows that in
the United States, leverage is managed more actively by shadow banks than by commercial
banks, thus highlighting that it is shadow banking that generates volatility for the transfer of
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assets. Growth in asset prices increases the assets of shadow banking, financed with short-term
debt. This creates a self-reinforcing process that includes balance sheet growth, increased
leverage, reduced risk premiums, and increased loans to the nonfinancial sector. In fact, for
Sieron (2016), shadow banking shows that non-banking institutions can also carry out credit
expansion and generate the economic cycle. Importantly, the latter activity also allows shadow
banks to expand credit on their own. This is because they can create liquid promissory notes
that work like money and are used as collateral against credit. The reuse of this guarantee
amplifies the creation of credit. Supporting these approaches are Fève el al. (2019), by
estimating a DSGE model of the United States economy with traditional and shadow banks
that interact. They prove that shadow banking amplifies the transmission of structural shocks.
They show how the leak to shadow entities reduces the ability of macroprudential policies
aimed at traditional credit to reduce economic volatility. They suggest that a countercyclical
capital buffer, if applied only to traditional banks, would have amplified the boom-bust cycle
associated with the 2007-2008 financial crisis. On the other hand, a broader regulatory scheme
targeting both traditional credit and shadow credit would have helped stabilise the economy.
Moosa (2017) agrees with these ideas, concluding that it does not make sense to regulate
deposit institutions while giving shadow banks a free hand to do as they please. Agresti and
Brence (2017) propose several additional risk indicators for shadow banking that could
potentially be included in the ESRB (European Systemic Risk Board) risk metrics framework,
such as leverage liquidity indicators and maturity transformation. They also present several
ratios of shadow banking that present these risks, but with the advantage that they are related
to commercial banking. This constitutes one of the objectives of our work, but from a
macroprudential perspective.
Although there are some advances in regulation by the Dodd-Frank Law, as stated by Gorton
and Metrick (2010), there are still significant regulatory gaps; the regulation of money market
mutual funds, securitisation and repos. They suggest that these areas require further regulation
because they played "the central role in the recent crisis." It should be noted that the fund
industry is one of the most important according to the size of shadow banking. The FSB (2017)
and Gerety (2017) highlight that an increase in assets held in certain investment funds has
increased the risks of liquidity transformation, underscoring the importance of addressing
structural vulnerabilities in asset management activities. Likewise, Bellavite et al. (2017)
conclude that money market funds, a significant part of shadow banks, increased systemic risk
in the UK before the 2008 crisis, show that the liquidity mismatch increases systemic risk.
Evidence indicates that shadow banking is highly vulnerable to liquidity shocks and is highly
procyclical, posing problems for financial and macroeconomic stability.
3. ANALYSIS OF BANKING IN SHADOW AND TRADITIONAL BANKING
It begins with an analysis of the evolution and consideration for the purposes of the work of
shadow banking in the United States. The institutions that are listed as shadow banking are the
same ones that Pollin and Heintz (2012) consider in their work on the United States financial
system. The institutions are represented in this first Figure, showing the total financial assets
of different entities considered shadow banking over domestic financial assets. It is observed
how the mutual funds present the highest growth, and in the crisis of 2002 and 2009, they
present a great decrease (in the Figures the assets of the various institutions are presented over
the total of the domestic financial assets).
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Figure 1

Figure 2.a represents mutual funds with respect to private deposit institutions, due to their
importance. Throughout the historical series, the decrease in the weight of the assets of private
deposit entities is observed, compared to the increase in assets in mutual funds. In figure 2.b
this time is represented against the total number of shadow banks. It is evidenced from 1992,
which is when the Basel I accord is implemented in the United States. Precisely from that year,
specifically in 1993, the assets of shadow banks exceed the assets of traditional banks.
Figure 2a.
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Figure 2b.

2.1 Canonical Analysis
First, a canonical analysis is carried out, the study period covers from the first quarter of 1993
to the last quarter of 2018 (the years in which we have data from all the series are taken). The
variables used are listed in Annex 1, different aspects of both types of banks, solvency,
liquidity, growth are covered of assets, financing structure and investment among others. The
data used to form the variables is collected from the FED for shadow banking and directly from
the FDIC for commercial banking. Canonical analysis is used, which consists of finding two
sets of base vectors, one for x that represents the set of variables of the traditional bank and
another set for y, that represents the set of variables of the shadow bank, such that the
correlations between the projections of the variables in these base vectors are maximized
mutually represented by 𝜌𝜌.
𝜌𝜌 =
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Being 𝑊𝑊 x y 𝑊𝑊 y projections on x and y, which are called canonical variables.
Being 𝐶𝐶𝓍𝓍𝓍𝓍 , 𝐶𝐶𝒴𝒴𝒴𝒴 the covariance matrices of the sets and 𝐶𝐶𝓍𝓍𝓍𝓍 the variance matrix between sets.
Subsequent canonical correlations are uncorrelated for different solutions:
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Figure 3 shows the correlation of matrix X and matrix Y of the values that represent the
variables defined for shadow banking and for commercial banking. The cross-correlation
matrix between both matrices is also represented.
Figure 3

2.1.1 First dimension
This dimension is called shadow banking and bank solvency. (As bank solvency increases, the
growth of total shadow banking assets over total domestic assets increases). Annex 1 shows
the correlations of the variables with the dimension. It can be concluded that when bank
solvency, and specifically regulatory solvency, a leak of financial resources to shadow banks
occurs. However, when bank solvency deteriorates, due to unfavorable economic conditions,
the growth of shadow banking assets is reduced, seeking the safety net of the regulated sector.
Figure 4 represents dimension 1 versus dimension 2.
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Figure 4

In the first dimension, it is observed that various ratios of shadow banking assets to GDP are
observed, saturating in a positive way in this dimension. Specifically, sb3 (Holding companies;
total financial assets), sb6 (Mutual funds; total financial assets), sb8 Mortgage real estate
investment trusts; total financial assets), sb9 (Real estate investment trusts; total financial
assets), sb 10 (Exchange-traded funds; total financial assets).
As well as bank solvency ratios b9 (Equity Capital to Assets) and b10 (Total Risk-Based
Capital Ratio (PCA)) and a solvency ratio sb17 (Financial assets / Financial Liabilities
(Security broker and dealers)) and liquidity sb18 ( Checkable deposits / Financial Assets
(Security broker and dealers)) of security brokers and dealers, as well as a liquidity ratio of
holding companies sb19 (Total Time and savings deposits; asset / total financial assets).
With a negative sign that saturates in this dimension, we have bank financial profitability (b2),
net interest margin (b4), the cost of financial assets (b3), net loans on total assets (b12) and
deposits insured on total deposits (b14) and coverage ratio (b7). It also correlates the ratio of
municipal assets to the total assets of the Mutual Funds (sb16) and debt assets to financial assets
(sb22), as well as the commercial role on financial assets of holding companies (sb23).
For higher values of this dimension, shadow banking occupies a greater position of assets over
domestic financial assets, there is greater financial solvency of commercial banks and security
brokers as well as greater liquidity of security brokers and holdings companies.
For smaller dimension values, the following indicators: the bank's financial performance is
higher, as well as its interest margin, as well as net loans on total assets and the proportion of
provisions on loans. The cost of financing also increases, as well as the interest margin that
favors financial profitability.
Municipal bonds on the total assets of mutual funds increase as this dimension becomes more
negative. The latter ratio saturates inversely to the ratio of financial assets of mutual funds to
domestic financial assets. This can be explained because when there is a decrease in the
financial assets of the funds over the domestic financial assets, the investment in these financial
assets that are safe and with good returns will grow.
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In holding companies, when the ratio of assets that have debt to total assets becomes higher,
their subsidiaries are likely to have less capital. This last ratio correlates negatively in the
dimension, as well as the regulatory capital ratios. Financial profitability also correlates jointly
with this ratio, negatively in this dimension. On the other hand, the commercial paper on the
financial assets in the holding companies correlates negatively in the dimension, it is assumed
that the debts are greater in the system and the emissions in the short term are increased to be
financed.
2.1.2. Second dimension
This dimension is called latent risk in traditional banking and in shadow banking, which
increases as the dimension decreases. Specifically, they correlate negatively on the dimension:
risk-weighted assets on total assets (b11), financing companies assets /total domestic assets
(sb2), the assets of issuers of asset-backed securities on total domestic assets (sb4), the assets
of the monetary funds over the total domestic assets (sb5), Security brokers and dealers on total
financial assets over total domestic assets (sb7) and shares of corporations / total assets (Mutual
Funds) (sb 12).
It correlates positively in the dimension, indicating a lower risk in the dimension of the
financing of deposits on total assets (b13).
In contrast, the total assets of depository institutions over national financial assets (b15), the
proportions of treasury assets with respect to the total assets of mutual funds (sb11) and holding
companies (sb 20), agreements of repurchase of securities / Total assets (sb14) and debt
securities / total assets (sb15) are positively correlated with the dimension.
The joint explanation for this dimension may be that when risk increases in traditional banking,
there is an increase in the business of the entities of the issuers of asset-backed securities with
loans that leave the balance sheet and are securitised. It also increases the business of finance
companies and the activity of security brokers and dealers. The risks that traditional banking
does not assume begin to be undertaken by this shadow bank. Therefore, the assets of deposit
institutions over total domestic assets, correlates negatively with this dimension. Regarding the
structure of mutual funds, investment in debt and in security repurchase agreements correlates
inversely in the dimension to investment in stocks. This may be due to at times of less risk
taking, investment shifts from equities to debt securities versus investments in equities.
In the first quadrant (see Figure 4) it is demonstrated how b15 (Assets of deposit institutions /
domestic financial assets) corresponds with sb 20 (Treasury securities / Financial assets
(Holding Companies)). When the financial assets of depository institutions increase, at the
holding level the proportion of treasury securities over financial assets increases. It may be due
to a security search by the holding entity.
In the second quadrant (see Figure 4), the bank solvency (b10) and the solvency sb17 (Financial
assets / Financial Liabilities (Security broker and dealers)) correlate between them, this is
because in times of recession when there is a greater risk, a greater solvency is required for
both entities. Holding companies also seek to increase their liquidity, to provide support to their
investees. For this reason, it also correlates positively sb19 (Total term deposits and savings;
assets / total financial assets (Holding Companies)).
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In the third quadrant b9 (Equity Capital to Assets) (See Figure 4), which represents a solvency
ratio, it is highly correlated with sb8 (Mortgage real estate investment trusts; total financial
assets / domestic financial assets), indicating that the greater the bank solvency, the more
financing in the mortgage market due to the increase in shadow banking.
In the fourth quadrant, b3 (cost of Earning Funding Assets) and sb23 (Commercial paper /
Financial assets (Holding Companies)) are highly aligned with each other and negatively with
dimension 1. The correlation can be explained, due to the increase in financing costs, the
issuance of commercial paper is more profitable and the holding companies make investments
in this asset.
Figure 5 represents the third dimension versus the first and second dimensions.
Figure 5
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2.1.3 The third dimension
It is called losses from traditional banking; A correlation of all the provision and loss ratios in
a positive way. Security repurchase agreements / financial assets (Holding Companies) sb21,
correlates positively, because the holding entities are granting liquidity to their investees. On
the other hand, economic profitability is negatively affected, therefore it is negatively
correlated.
Dimension 4 and 5 are not taken since the connections are exceptionally low and have a low
explanatory power, the Figure can be seen in Annex 2 (the correlations are very low and are
within the circle radius 0.5).
2.1.4 Temporal analysis of dimensions
In the temporal analysis (see figure 6), dimension 2 the latent risk in traditional banking has
been inverted so that a higher value implies greater risk. It can be seen that the increase in
solvency requirements together with shadow banking grow evenly throughout the entire
sample (dimension 1), specifically from 2002. Exactly, on July 4, Internal Ratings-Based
Systems for Corporate Credit and Operational Risk Advanced Measurement Approaches for
Regulatory Capital is issued, which together with Basel II becomes more demanding from the
bank asset. As of 2009, with the 2009 issuance of the Basel Accords and subsequent
implementation, the solvency of traditional banking, along with shadow banking in this
dimension, increases again. It can be inferred that before the implementation of Basel III, by
the United States there is already an increase in solvency, along with an increase in shadow
banking.
Figure 6

Regarding dimension 2 of latent risk in both types of banking, a decrease is observed from
2009 as a result of the crisis; with very high growth in the face of the crisis of 2003 and 2008.
On the other hand, dimension 3, bank losses is seen to manifest just as the growth of dimension
2 (latent risk), reaching its maximum just 2 years later to reach the maximum both in the period
2000-2002, and in the period 2008-2010.
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3.Analysis of Shadow Banking Gaps
In this section, the objective is to obtain the gaps and group them, through the ratio of total
shadow banking assets to GDP. It seeks to obtain a measure of risk from shadow banking. The
gap of each of the 10 series that reflect each type of shadow banking is extracted, as well as the
gap of the series formed by the ratio of total assets to GDP for deposit institutions 2. Annex 3
presents the series and their gaps according to all available data. For this, the Holdrick Precott
filter is used, which extracts the trend, Ƭ𝑡𝑡 , minimising the following function:
Τ

Τ−1

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚Ƭ𝑡𝑡 �(𝒴𝒴𝒴𝒴 + Ƭ𝑡𝑡) + λ � [(Ƭ𝑡𝑡+1 − Ƭ𝑡𝑡 ) − (Ƭ𝑡𝑡 − Ƭ𝑡𝑡−1 )]2
𝑡𝑡=1

Being λ the correction factor 3.

2

𝑡𝑡=2

Then we use the time series cluster, in this case the data from the first quarter of 1993 to the
last quarter of 2018 are used (the years in which we have data from all the series are taken),
with the same data the regression tree and Random Forest will be performed. All values are
present in this time range. The distance between clusters is calculated with the following
formula:
𝑑𝑑(𝒾𝒾 ⋃ 𝑗𝑗, 𝑘𝑘) = 𝛼𝛼𝒾𝒾 𝑑𝑑(𝒾𝒾, 𝑘𝑘) + 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 𝑑𝑑(𝑗𝑗, 𝑘𝑘) + 𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑(𝒾𝒾, 𝑗𝑗) + 𝛾𝛾│𝑑𝑑(𝒾𝒾, 𝑘𝑘) + 𝑑𝑑(𝑗𝑗, 𝑘𝑘)│
𝑑𝑑 (𝑞𝑞, 𝑟𝑟) is the distance between the clusters 𝒞𝒞𝑞𝑞 and 𝒞𝒞𝑟𝑟 , 𝑑𝑑(𝒾𝒾 ⋃ 𝑗𝑗, 𝑘𝑘) is the distance between the
clusters 𝒞𝒞𝒾𝒾 ⋃ 𝒞𝒞𝑗𝑗 y 𝒞𝒞𝐾𝐾 and the parameters 𝛼𝛼𝒾𝒾 , 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 , 𝛽𝛽 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝛾𝛾 which, together with the distance
function, determines the method for the agglomerative hierarchical grouping.
With the time series cluster it is observed how the gaps are grouped and the groups that present
a similar behavior are interpreted. Below is the dendogram (Figure 7) that allows us to
differentiate the groups according to height.
Figure 7

To see different evaluation measures for the establishment of countercyclical capital see Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2018) “Towards a sectoral application of the countercyclical capital buffer: a literature
review”
3
Galán (2019) In his work he discusses the smoothing parameter to be used for the Holdrick Precot filter.
2
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We chose 7 groups, according to the dendogram. A cut is made at a height of 100. Groups let
you see how gaps behave. The groups that are formed are (Annex 4 presents the Figure of the
grouped series):
Group 1: The Private depository Gap is grouped.
Group 2: The Finances Companies Gap, the Funding Corporations Gap, the Mortage Rate Gap
and the Real State Gap are grouped. This group groups the entities with a great impact on
financing.
Group 3: The Holding Companies Gap is grouped.
Group 4: The Issuers of asset-backed securities Gap and the Security Brokers Gap are grouped.
In this group, a large cyclical component is observed due to the observed gap, inside the bench
in the shade. It is observed that its gap is the one with the most amplitude presentingwithin all
groups. It is the type of shadow banking that is furthest from the trend both in times of shocks
and expansion.
Group 5: The Money Markets Gap is grouped.
Group 6: The Mutal funds Gap is grouped.
Group 7: The Exchange-traded funds Gap is grouped.

4. Gap and delinquency analysis

In this section, the aim is to analyse which gap is more important in determining bank losses,
for this, the Percent of Loans and Leases Noncurrent (b6) is used as a predictor. With this, it is
intended to study the influence of these gaps on bank losses and with it on banking crises.
A regression tree is then performed in which, in addition to the gaps previously calculated, the
credit gap over GDP is added, as a predictor variable. The analysis is performed for the same
period as the canonical analysis and the time series cluster. The gaps have the following codes
represented in Table 1:
Table 1
Codes

Gaps

Gap 1

Gap Private depository

Gap 2
Gap 3

Gap Finances Companies
Gap Funding Corporations

Gap 4

Gap Holding Companies

Gap 5
Gap 6

Gap Issuers of asset-backed securities
Gap Money Markets

Gap 7
Gap 8

Gap Mutual Funds
Gap Security Brokers

Gap 9

Gap Mortage Rate

Gap 10
Gap 11

Gap Real State
Gap Exchange-traded funds
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A regression tree is used 4, which is a machine learning method to build prediction models
from data. As advantages, these methods have an easy interpretation and their solidity at
extreme values. It also enables capturing linear and non-linear relationships and there may be
a link between variables. As problems, this methodology presents a remarkably high variance,
that is, a small change in the data can cause different partitions of the data. This will be
corrected with the use of different Machine Learning ensemble methods.
The regression tree follows the following model:
Let Y be a response variable and let p be predictor variables x1, x2, ..., xp, where the xs are
taken fixed and Y is a random variable. The statistical problem is to establish a relationship
between Y and the X's in such a way that it is possible to predict Y based on the values of the
X's. To do this, we want to estimate the function of its probability such as:
E[Y|x1,x2,...,xp]
It seeks to obtain a minimum variance within each node τ of the tree,
i(τ)= ∑𝑖𝑖∈τ( (Yi −Y(τ))2
Where Y (τ) is the average of Y ́s within the node τ.
To divide a node τ into two child nodes, τL (left node) and τR (right node), the goodness of a
division s is defined as:
∆I(τ) = i(τ) − i(τL) − i(τR)
With this last equation, the impurity reduction is obtained when the parent node is passed to
the child node, the impurity reduction is sought to be maximum.
The objective is to obtain the maximum homogeneity of those of the terminal nodes.
It is sought that R (τ) be minimized as:
R (τ)= ∑τ∈𝜁𝜁 i (τ)
Where ζ represents the set of terminal nodes.

In the regression tree (see Figure 8) it is proven that G4 representing the Gap of holding
companies is the most important variable to predict insolvency in the traditional banking
system, when the gap is greater than 1.42 and G2 (the gap of the Finances companies) is greater
than 0.29. Bank losses are in the order of 4,898. In the extreme case of less losses we have for
G4 values of 1.42 and for values greater than G7 (Gap of the Mutual Funds) higher than -1.41
and for G5 values (Gap Issuers of asset-backed securities) higher at -4,9068 the lower bank
solvency values.
Figure 8

The strengths and weaknesses of the regression trees is developed by Loh (2011) and the development of the
algorithm by Breiman et al. (1984).

4
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The MSE we get 0.200686, which means the error is 0.4479. These results may lead us to
reflect on a regulatory surcharge on the gap for certain entities, according to their influence on
bank losses, which we will examine with the application of Random Forest, we use this
methodology with the intention of improving the prediction. In prediction trees like all
statistical models, the balance between bias and variance must be taken into account. By the
concept of bias, it is understood how far the predictions from the real values are on average.
Variance is understood as the variation of the model, depending on the sample used in the
training phase. More complex models tend to reduce bias, increasing the predictability of the
model. On the other hand, an overfit can occur, that is, the model adjusts so much to the training
data that it does not correctly predict new data. Therefore, a model with a balance between bias
and overfit is pursued.
In predictive tree models with many nodes, they tend to fit the training sample very well, but
at the cost of greater variance. With the assembly method used in this work, a balance between
bias and variance is pursued. In the method of Random Forest 5, repeated sampling is carried
out. A model is fitted with the different samples of the population, and the result is averaged,
reducing the variance. For this, bootstrapping is used, generating different samples through
resampling. With each of these samples a tree is made, which is not pruned, having a reduced
bias but a greater variance. The algorithm's stop system is the minimum number of observations
that the final nodes must have. It is a modification of the bagging model by mitigating the
correlation between the trees; this is achieved by selecting the predictors at random. It prevents
a very influential predictor from dominating the construction of the trees. The MSE estimates
the prediction error of the model considering these observations that have been "left out of the
1
training sample". This error is calculated as follows: 𝑛𝑛 ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 (yi − yiOOB) 2
Being 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 the prediction for observation is obtained by averaging the individual predictions
of the trees for which that observation has been left out of the training sample and real the
actual value of the response variable.
We managed to improve the prediction by obtaining an MSE of 0.1794699, improving the
prediction that we obtained using the regression tree.
To calculate the importance of the predictors, the increase in the MSE and the increase in the
purity of the nodes are used. The increase in the MSE identifies the influence of each predictor
on the MSE of the model estimated by the out of bag error.
MSE OOB (Xj permuted) =

1

𝑛𝑛

∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 (yi − yiOOB(Xj permuted) 2

After this, for each variable 𝑋𝑋 in each tree t, the difference between the two measures 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
OOB (𝑋𝑋 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ed) and MSE OOB is calculated. This difference, for each variable, is summed
in all the trees, averaged and normalised between the standard deviation of the differences. The
result of this process is a measure of the importance of each variable. If the predictor that is not
included provides information about the model, the MSE will increase.
The increase in the purity of the nodes is calculated by the decrease in the MSE, which is
calculated as the average decreases. Therefore, the higher the value, the greater the contribution
of the predictor to the model (see Figure 9).

5

Breiman (2001) develop the advantages of random forest.
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In the Figure we see the most important variables for the model, they are G4 (Gap Holding
Companies), G10 (Gap Real State); G9 (Gap Mortgage Rate) and G7 (Gap Mutual Funds), to
predict bank insolvency.
Figure 9

We will now see within the model how these variables interact in the prediction of bank
delinquencies. It is shown in Figure 10 how when the G4 is greater than 2% and the G7 is less
than approximately 1%, the highest percentage of failures occurs. This is supposed to be caused
by the rapid takeover of liquidity from such funds. Something similar happens with G10.
Figure 10 a
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Figure 10 b

In the prediction (Figure 10 a) for G7 that represents the gap of the Mutual Funds and G4 that
represents the Gap of the Holdings companies, it is displayed that for a higher Gap of the
Holdings Companies, the highest percentage of failures is predicted, together with a lower Gap
value of mutual funds below zero. However, exactly when the Gap G10 (Gap Real State) is
less than -0.5 major failures occur (see Figure 10 b) and G4 exceeds 2%.
This constitutes a system that could be used to establish regulatory surcharges for shadow
banking, based on calculated gaps. Taking into account those entities that may have a greater
influence on financial stability, for example by focusing more on gaps than those determined
by our model and previously explained.
CONCLUSIONS
With the canonical analysis, three dimensions are obtained that allow establishing various
ratios of shadow banking and traditional banking, the dimensions are the first shadow banking
and bank solvency, the second dimension latent risk in traditional banking and in shadow
banking and the lost third dimension of traditional banking. It is concluded that when bank
solvency increases, there is a growth in shadow banking. The increase in bank risk is
accompanied by an increase in certain activities of shadow banking, such as issuers of assetbacked securities and financing companies, among others. The risks that traditional banking
does not assume begin to be assumed by banking in the shade.
Shadow banking is largely determined by regulation, in times of strict regulation there is an
increase in such banking. A part of the credit and financial activity is directed towards this type
of banking, avoiding the stricter regulation of traditional banking. On the other hand, in times
of crisis, shadow banking rapidly reduces its size, resources are quickly transferred to the
regulated sector, benefiting from its safety net, increasing the procyclicality of the system.
Therefore, Basel III's attempts to reduce procyclicality through countercyclical capital, we
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believe are incomplete in not considering shadow banking, the main responsibility for the
procyclicality of the system.
The gaps of the assets of different shadow banking institutions on GDP are proposed as possible
instruments to measure risk. With the time series cluster, 7 groups of gaps are obtained. These
instruments can be used to extend the macroprudential regulation of shadow banking and avoid
leaks that occur from the regulated to the unregulated sector and vice versa according to
economic status.
One of the great advantages of the work is the approximation of the identification of instability
in traditional banking, understood as delinquency through the gaps of shadow banking and
traditional banking, evaluating its importance according to machine learning. Specifically, the
gaps according to the random forest algorithm that best predict bank delinquencies are, in order
of importance, the Holding Companies Gap, Real State Gap, Mortage Rate Gap, and the Gap
Mutual Funds Gap.
This analysis can also be used as an early warning mechanism to detect imbalances in shadow
banking that can revert to traditional banking.
Appendix 1
Codes

b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
b7
b8
b9
b10
b11
b12
b13
b14
b15

Banking
variables
Return on Assets
Return on Equity
Cost of Earning
Funding Assets
Net
Interest
Margin
Net Charge offs to
loans and leases
Percent of Loans
and
Leases
Noncurrent
Loss Allowance to
non-current Loans
&
Leases
(Coverage ratio)
Loss Allowance to
Loans and Leases
Equity Capital to
Assets
Total Risk-Based
Capital
Ratio
(PCA)
Risk-Weighted
Assets to Total
Assets
Net Loans &
Leases to Total
Assets
Total Deposits as a
% of Total Assets
Insured Deposits
as a Percent of
Total Deposits
Assets of deposit
institutions
/
domestic financial
assets

Dimension 1

Dimension 2

Dimension 3

Dimension 4

-0.24888380
-0.54000601

0.004483917
0.029116607

-0.555530613
-0.466907946

0.164376340
0.107758914

-0.91090671

-0.195078100

0.002845710

0.106382717

-0.88890539

0.166769401

0.180498610

-0.187531148

0.26032463

-0.081264157

0.698145481

-0.473457379

0.45063712

0.227678386

0.584733155

-0.590059537

-0.72389117

-0.297851456

-0.343528045

0.381603069

0.03450898

0.283938177

0.643075605

-0.639635763

0.98442774

-0.032264518

-0.060793003

0.002262065

0.76100810

0.448037896

0.002100055

-0.337550936

-0.17271690

-0.804713418

-0.206499265

0.232846178

-0.78667846

-0.427995850

-0.059456931

0.385338528

0.44164940

0.754063417

-0.386445171

-0.233189900

-0.70759407

0.406359582

0.142943338

-0.345767544

-0.27779258

0.699424109

0.619227016

0.104927570
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Codes
sb1

sb2

sb3

sb4

sb5

sb6

sb7

sb8

sb9

sb10

sb11
sb12

sb13

sb14

Shadow banking
variables
Finance
companies;
total
financial
assets/
domestic financial
assets
Funding
corporations; total
financial
assets/
domestic financial
assets
Holding
companies;
total
financial
assets/
domestic financial
assets
Issuers of assetbacked securities;
total
financial
assets/
domestic
financial assets
Money
market
funds;
total
financial
assets/
domestic financial
assets
Mutual funds; total
financial
assets/
domestic financial
assets
Security
brokers
and dealers; total
financial
assets/
domestic financial
assets
Mortgage
real
estate investment
trusts;
total
financial
assets/
domestic financial
assets
Real
estate
investment trusts;
total
financial
assets/
domestic
financial assets
Exchange-traded
funds;
total
financial
assets/
domestic financial
assets
Treasury securities
/
total
assets
(Mutual Funds)
shares
of
corporations / total
assets
(Mutual
Funds)
Gse
backed
securities / total
assets
(Mutual
Funds)
security repurchase
agreements / Total
assets
(Mutual
Funds)

Dimension 1

Dimension 2

Dimension 3

Dimension 4

-0.54115778

-0.36634820

0.64948903

0.254277281

-0.46755070

-0.72971227

0.28867522

0.235878313

0.92761724

0.18111119

0.07489467

-0.259532005

-0.07510023

-0.64930809

0.60532254

0.399014562

-0.03316528

-0.70701426

0.53947530

-0.151977913

0.74325177

-0.33468202

-0.54292708

-0.127664205

-0.17006740

-0.57931600

0.58296888

0.357006168

0.94157695

0.03512861

-0.18372190

0.146800530

0.93652712

0.11071235

-0.24560593

0.099156753

0.84522940

0.23495232

-0.39123327

-0.045755793

0.08946181

0.93892619

-0.14828566

-0.095129454

0.12249028

-0.89689983

-0.33144758

0.142518834

-0.17159972

0.28287264

0.85238037

0.017307047

-0.38058341

0.55508625

-0.10622338

0.042707637
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sb15
sb16

sb17

sb18

Sb19

sb20

sb21

sb22

Sb23

sb24

sb25

Debt securities /
Total
assets
(Mutual Funds)
Municipal
Securities / total
assets
(Mutual
Funds)
Financial assets /
Financial
Liabilities
(Security
broker
and dealers)
Checkable deposits
/ Financial Assets
(Security
broker
and dealers)
Total Time and
savings deposits;
asset/total financial
assets
(Holding
Companies)
Treasury
securities/Financial
assets(Holding
Companies)
security repurchase
agreements
/financial
assets
(Holding
Companies)
Debt
assets/financial
assets
(Holding
Companies)
Commercial
paper/Financial
assets
(Holding
Companies)
Checkable deposits
and
currency;
asset/Financial
assets
(Money
Markets)
Total time and
savings deposits;
asset/Financial
asset
(Money
Markets)

-0.13089916

0.88215261

0.33670933

-0.147350322

-0.68610198

0.64676317

0.25204025

-0.019843913

0.63600609

0.34791303

-0.48739166

-0.335072642

0.88914940

0.15674380

-0.19719617

-0.108404850

0.59956126

0.39106557

-0.06713752

-0.364931094

-0.27889965

0.74009250

-0.01817269

-0.127490768

0.17375804

-0.27783085

0.47403229

-0.429769323

-0.70783432

0.12458720

-0.32120143

0.501664047

-0.88698906

-0.18699191

0.16332653

0.008208795

0.60746843

0.03496400

-0.09832170

-0.201502985

0.62905545

-0.11093040

0.17970024

-0.443637047

150

AABFJ | Vol. 16, No.4, 2022 Fernández Fernández | Banking Stability and Shadow Banking

Appendix 2

Appendix 3
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